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How Clearly Must a Judge Instruct the Jury That It
Should Consider Mitigating as Well as Aggravating
Factors inMaking Its Sentencing Decision?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 143-146. © 1999 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis. 532011881; jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. He is the
co-author of West's FederalJury
Practiceand Instructions
(5th edition).

Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not scheduled to be
Ilfiled until after PREVIEW went to
press.

ISSUE
When a jury in a death penalty case
informs the judge that it does not
understand the sentencing instructions and asks whether it is free to
consider a sentence less than death
if it finds one or more aggravating
factors, is the judge constitutionally
required to clarify that a death sentence is not mandatory upon the
finding of an aggravating factor and
that the jury should consider mitigating evidence as well in making its
sentencing decision?
FACTS
In early February 1993, Lonnie
Weeks, Jr., who was 20 years old
and on probation for a 1992 drug
conviction, participated in a burglary of a residence in Fayetteville,
1N.C. During the burglary, Weeks
lob tained a set of keys to a car
parked at the residence and stole
the car. Weeks later drove the car to

Washington, D.C., intending to sell
it or trade it for drugs. Weeks
carried a semiautomatic pistol
loaded with hollow-point bullets.
This type of bullet is referred to as
a "man-stopper."
In the evening of Feb. 23, Weeks
was riding as a passenger in the car
and his uncle was driving. Weeks
and his uncle were traveling from
Washington to Richmond, Va.
Around midnight, a state trooper in
Virginia stopped the car for speeding. The trooper approached the car
on foot from the driver's side. Upon
the trooper's request, Weeks' uncle
got out of the car and was standing
toward the left rear of the car. The
trooper then asked Weeks to step
out of the car.
Weeks got out on the right side of
the car with his pistol. He then fired
at least six bullets at the officer. The
officer fell to the pavement unconscious and died within minutes at
(Continued on Page 144)
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the scene with his own pistol still
"snapped" in its holster. Weeks,
with his uncle as a passenger, then
drove the car from the scene and
parked it at a nearby service station. He then returned to the scene
of the shooting on foot and retrieved
his uncle's driver's license, which
had been dropped on the pavement.
Weeks rejoined his uncle, and they
were found by the police a short
time later in the parking lot of a
nearby motel.
In October 1993, a Virginia jury
convicted Weeks of murder.
Following the jury's findings of guilt
on the capital murder charge,
Weeks presented mitigating evidence as to his religious upbringing,
the abrupt manner in which the
events surrounding the shooting
unfolded, and his feelings of
remorse.
During the penalty phase of Week's
trial, the trial court gave the jury a
lengthy sentencing instruction. The
trial court denied Week's proffered
instruction that it had the option to
give effect to the mitigating evidence and to sentence Weeks to life
in prison even if it found the state
had proved one or both of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt. During its deliberations, the
jury asked the judge whether it was
their duty to issue the death penalty
if they found that Weeks was guilty
of one of the aggravating factors, or
whether they must decide whether
or not to issue a death sentence
even after finding that one of the
aggravating factors had been met.
Rather than issuing a clarifying
instruction, the trial court instructed the jury in writing to see the second paragraph of Instruction No. 2,
which read as follows:
"If you find from the evidence
that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable
doubt either of the two alterna-

tives, and as to that alternative
you are unanimous, then you
may fix the punishment of the
defendant at death, or if you
believe from all the evidence
that the death penalty is not
justified, then you shall fix the
punishment of the defendant at
life imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic] and a fine of
a specific amount, but not
more than $100,000.00."
The trial court overruled Weeks'
objection and denied his request
that the jury be instructed that it
could impose a life sentence upon
finding one or both aggravating factors. The court reasoned that the
jurors "just have to be drawn to that
paragraph to find their answer."
After several more hours of deliberation, the jury found that Weeks'
conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile in that it involved depravity of mind and/or aggravated battery
to the victim beyond the minimum
necessary to commit the murder.
After the jury recommended that
Weeks be sentenced to death, the
trial court sentenced Weeks to
death.

(E.D.Va. 1998). Weeks then filed an
application for a certificate of
appealability with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, raising numerous constitutional claims
of error.
Among other things, Weeks argued
that the trial court's refusal to clarify its capital sentencing instructions
to the jury after they indicated confusion with the instruction prevented the consideration of relevant mit.
igating evidence in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Weeks had failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right. It denied his
application for a certificate of
appealability and dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 176
F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1999).
On Sept. 1, 1999, the Supreme
Court stayed Weeks' execution and
granted his petition for a writ of certiorari limited to the question relating to the issue of the trial court's
claimed failure to instruct the jury
about mitigating factors.

On direct appeal, the Virginia
Supreme Court upheld Weeks' conviction and death sentence. 248 Va.
460 (1994). The U.S. Supreme
Court denied Weeks' petition for a
writ of certiorari. 516 U.S. 829
(1995).

CASE ANALYSIS
A writ of habeas corpus provides a
means by which the legal authority
under which a person is detained
can be challenged. A writ of habeas
corpus may be used to reexamine
federal constitutional issues even
after trial and review by the state
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953). By means of a writ of
habeas corpus, a federal court may
order the discharge of any person
held by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

After exhausting all available state
remedies, Weeks petitioned the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia for habeas corpus relief. The district court dismissed the petition. 4 F.Supp.2d 497

The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
sets forth the standard of review
that must be applied by a federal
court in a habeas corpus proceeding. Under the AEDPA, a state

Weeks also pled guilty to the use of
a firearm in the commission of a
murder and a related grand larceny
charge, for which he was sentenced
to 13 years in prison. Those charges
are not at issue on appeal.

Issue No. 3

court's perfunctory decision is reasonable if it is at least minimally
consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case. The Fourth
Circuit upheld the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision.
Weeks argues that the trial court
prevented the jury from considering
relevant mitigating evidence in violation of Boyde v. California,494
U.S. 370 (1990). Specifically, Weeks
points to the failure of the trial
court, in response to a specific jury
request for clarification, to instruct
the jury clearly that it was not
required to sentence Weeks to death
just because it found at least one
aggravating factor.
Weeks stresses that the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration
of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part
of the process of inflicting the death
penalty. Consequently, Weeks says
that a jury cannot be precluded
from considering relevant mitigating
evidence in a capital case.
According to Weeks, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly reversed death
sentences imposed on a record that
created genuine doubt that the sentencer had understood its right and
responsibility to consider mitigating
circumstances as well as aggravating
ones. Weeks points out that the
jurors in his case advised the trial
court that they were confused as to
whether, if they found aggravating
factors, they were duty-bound to
impose a death sentence without
considering mitigating factors.
Weeks asserts that instead of clarifying the instructions, the trial judge
persisted in directing the jurors
back to the very same jury instruction that they had just reported
they did not understand and which,
under one of the two alternative

readings that they posed for the
court's resolution, unconstitutionally forbade them to consider mitigation. Under these circumstances,
Weeks argues that the very least
that can be said is that there is
a reasonable likelihood that the
sentencers did not consider the
evidence he had offered in
mitigation. Given the jurors'
questions and the court's nonresponse, he contends that the
possibility that the jury conducted
its task improperly is great enough
to require resentencing.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Eighth Amendment requires
that a jury in a death penalty case
be able to consider and give effect
to all relevant mitigating evidence
offered by the petitioner. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Evidence about the defendant's
background and character is necessary for the sentencer to make an
individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty. Penry v. Iynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989). In determining the validity
of a challenged instruction, the
instruction may not be judged in
artificial isolation but must be
viewed in the context of the overall
charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
141 (1973).
In Boyde v. California,494 U.S. 370
(1990), the Supreme Court held
that the proper inquiry in cases in
which a capital sentencing instruction allegedly prevented the consideration of mitigating evidence is
"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the
challenged instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." 494
U.S. at 380. The Supreme Court
concluded in Boyde that there was
not a reasonable likelihood that the
challenged instruction prevented
the consideration of mitigating evidence in light of the fact that the

instruction told the jury that "you
shall" consider "fajny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity
of the crime" and that the jury was
presented with four days of evidence at the penalty phase relating
to Boyde's background and character." 494 U.S. at 381.
Applying Boyde in the case of
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S.
269 (1998), the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the
Virginia pattern capital-sentencing
instruction, the instruction at issue
in this case, against a challenge on
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds. The Supreme Court pointed out that "the sentencer may not
be precluded from considering, and
may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. However, the State may
shape and structure the jury's consideration of mitigation so long as it
does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating
evidence." 118 S.Ct. at 761.
(Citations omitted.)
In Buchanan, the Supreme Court
held that the instruction did not
prevent the jury's consideration of
any mitigating evidence. By directing the jury to base its decision on
"all the evidence," the Court
explained, the instruction afforded
jurors an opportunity to consider
mitigating evidence. The Court
noted that while the instruction
informed the jurors that if they
found that an aggravating factor had
been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, they "may fix" the penalty at
death, it then directed that if they
believed all the evidence justified a
lesser sentence, they "shall" impose
a life sentence. The Court concluded that this instruction permitted
the jury to impose a life sentence
even if it found that an aggravating
factor had been proved.

(Continued on Page 146)
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Even if it were to entertain some
doubt as to the clarity of the
instruction, the Supreme Court in
Buchanan declared that the two
days of testimony relating to mitigating evidence and the extensive
arguments of the defense and the
prosecution on the effect that such
evidence should be given in the sentencing determination demonstrated
that there was "not a reasonable
likelihood" that the instructions had
precluded the jury's consideration of
the defendant's mitigating evidence
in violation of Boyde.

The Court is now asked to determine whether a trial court's failure
to provide an explanation in
response to a jury's request for clarification of its facially constitutional
instruction on mitigation and aggravation requires the case to be
returned to the state trial court for
resentencing.

In effect, Weeks is arguing that the
trial court's failure to clarify a jury
instruction that has been determined to be facially constitutional
violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights because the
jury's question placed the trial court
on notice that it was reasonably
likely that the jury would apply
the instruction in a way that prevented consideration of mitigating
evidence.

For Ronald Angelone (Robert H.
Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Virginia
(804) 786-4624)

ATTORNEYS FOR THE

PARTIES
For Lonnie Weeks, Jr. (Glen A. Huff
(757) 499-1841)

This is not the first time that the
Supreme Court has been asked to
return a capital case for resentencing because of the alleged failure of
the jurors to consider mitigating evidence properly. In Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Scalia,
& Kennedy, J.J., dissenting), the
Court returned a case to the state
trial court for resentencing because
of the substantial probability that
the jurors thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating evidence unless they unanimously agreed on the existence of a
particular mitigating circumstance.

Issue No. 3

